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1、 畢業(yè)論文 論 文 名 稱 農業(yè)銀行股份制改革的障礙及對策研究學 生 姓 名 指 導 教 師 專 業(yè) 金融學 學 院 金融學院 附錄一Functions of Global Commercial BanksCredit ServiceThe primary function of a global commercial bank, of course, is to accept deposits and lend money. Indeed lending is the cornerstone of global banking activity. Banks is overseas mark
2、ets may lend money in local currency to local clients out of branches or subsidiaries in foreign countries, funded by local currency deposits or by local money-market borrowings. For example, Deutsche Banks branch in Mexico City may lend pesos to a local car manufacturer, funded by peso deposits in
3、its local branch. This is purely local business, in which the bank competes with domestic banks or with affiliates of other foreign financial institutions.Alternatively, the bank may also engage in cross-border lending, in which a loan is made to a borrower in a country other than the lenders reside
4、nce, and is denominated in a currency other than that of the borrowers currency. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in 1998, cross-border lending doubled in previous decade. For example, Deutsche Banks branch in London may loan U.S dollars to the same car manufacture in Mexico City
5、. This loan is funded by dollars generated worldwide.All lending activities, whether direct or syndicated, should generate revenue for the bank. The spread is akin to gross profit on the loan; it is the difference between the interest the bank earns on the loan and the interest it pays on its own bo
6、rrowed funds. The spread should be sufficient to cover overhead, risk, and profits. Lending activities can also generate a variety of fees. One form of lending, for example, is the revolving credit facility. This permits the customer to borrow, or draw, up to a certain maximum amount over an agreed
7、time period under an agreed interest formula. This formula is usually based on the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR(the interest rate paid between banks for dollars on deposit in London), plus a margin reflecting the borrowers creditworthiness. Thus General Motors, for example, might pay LIBO
8、R plus 1/4 percentage point, while Bolivia might pay LIBOR plus 3percetage points. The bank, in turn, earns a commitment fee for standing ready to lend, whether or not the funds are actually disbursed. As we shall see, bans earn fees from a variety of lending-based services, such as syndicated loans
9、 and letters of credit. Syndicated Loan FacilitiesSyndicated Loan are central tool international banking, widely used by banks to meet customers need for large-scale and/or high-risk loans. A syndicated loan is a credit extended by a group of bank to a single customer, usually on common terms. This
10、permits the risk, which might be too large for one bank to accept on its own, to be shared out among a large group of bank. It also facilitates the extension of credits that would otherwise be too big for one bank to handle. Moreover, the syndication technique enables large and medium-sized regional
11、 banks to participate in international lending activities. Syndicated Loans are accompanied by a weighty set of loan documentation and some standard legal agreement. For example, the agreement will usually specify the judgment currency and legal jurisdiction if the parties find it necessary to go to
12、 court; it will specify that all creditors are to be treated equally; and it will require the borrower, if a government, to waive its right to sovereign immunity(meaning that the bank can sue the government if necessary).Syndication can be a handsome source of fee revenue for the lead bank or banks.
13、 In general, the borrower pays a commitment fee on the funds that are not disbursed, plus interest on the funds that are drawn down (usually, LIBOR plus a margin), as well as agent fee. Typically, one or more large bank acts as lead or agent in the facility, gathering information for use in judging
14、the creditworthiness of the borrower organizing the loan, and selling it down to other participating banks. The lead institution must have the ability to market the credit to other financial institutions, and to perform the necessary tasks of structuring and pricing the credit. Chase Manhattan (now
15、J. P. Morgan Chase) has long reigned as the top bank in syndicated lending worldwide, with around 25 percent market share.The notion that syndicated loans reduce risk by sharing it out received a rude awakening in the 1980s, however, Credits to shaky Latin American borrowers, for example, were syndi
16、cated widely, often unsophisticated regional institutions with little or no expertise in international lending. There is a tendency for participants in the syndication to replay heavily o the credit analysis of the large, more sophisticated bans, and it is unclear to what extent the lead bank is res
17、ponsible for the accuracy of the information presented on the borrow.Thus it is not surprising that following a period of fast-paced growth in the 1970s, the syndicated loan market dried up after 1981 as a huge portion of bank resources were redirected into rescheduling problem loans to emerging mar
18、ket borrowers. Many bankers came to believe that the syndication process contributed to problems in unraveling the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s. Many small, regional banks were clearly in over their heads., and they became a weak link as the rescheduling process unfolded. (Why were local ban
19、ks in Louisiana and Kentucky lending to Brazil in the first place?) By the mid-1980s, many banks had transferred or fired their syndication experts and the bank closed down their syndication departments.The process was accelerated by a tighter international ban regulatory regime, which emerged after
20、 the Basel agreement on capital adequacy was announced in1988. This agreement required bans to maintain a certain ratio capital to loans according to a complex and controversial formula, producing a era of retrenchment for money. For the next few years, international bans were forced to build up the
21、ir capital bases and were drawn away from private sector lending toward sovereign (loans to governments and public sector entities), which require less allocations of risk capital. As a result, ”club” deals became more popular I the late 1980s. Rather than a syndication of 100 or more banks club dea
22、ls were put together quietly by a handful of big banks. As the 1980s gave way to 1990s, however the syndicated loan market began to rise from its ashes. With Third World debt issues resolved and capital adequacy levels healthy once more, banks began looking to rebuild their loan portfolios, while bo
23、rrowers were eager to take advantage of the bans willingness to lend once more. Syndicated loans can provide large amounts of funding very quickly and easily. They guarantee confidentiality to the borrower, which may be critical if the customer raising funds for a acquisition or merger. Accordingly,
24、 by the middle to late 1990s, the revival in international syndicated lending had turned into a boom.The number of new syndicated loans hit a new record I 199697, amid increasingly fierce competition among banks to win the coveted (and lucrative) position of lead manager or agent. Spreads on loans t
25、o emerging market banks and subinvestment-grade European companies declined to unheard-of lows. Loans to Czech and South African bans, which would have been doe at around 1.0 percentage point above LIBOR just 18 months earlier, were made at just 0.2 percentage points above LIBOR in 1997. Price diffe
26、rentiation between top-grade and second-tier borrowers, according to some observers, declined to dangerously low levels. During 1997 the gap between spreads paid by developed country borrowers ad developing country borrowers almost disappeared. Partly because banks were so keen to win mandates from
27、emerging market borrowers I order to establish new relationships, major mispricing of credit risk undoubtedly occurred. Bankers insist, though, that they demanded more ancillary, fee-based business to accompany the low-cost loans.Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the market for syndicate
28、d lending tightened up once more, and some of this mispricing has been corrected. In fact the latest development is the use of “market-flex” clauses to protect bankers against some of the risk involved in syndicated lending. These clauses, which were pioneered by Chase in 1997 and became increasingl
29、y popular I the next two years, allow lenders to alter the pricing or structure of the la as market condition fluctuate. During 1998 and 1999 spreads also rose sharply, especially on syndicated loans to emerging market countries such as those in Latin America. The strongly rated Chilean electric com
30、pany, for example was able to borrow at LIBOR plus 0.25 percentage points in early 1998; by year-end, the spread had widened to 2.25 percentage points.In the first half of 1999, volumes in the syndicated loan market soared once more, fueled by a boom in European mergers and acquisitions. Syndicated
31、lending has reemerged as the primary source of finance for mergers and acquisitions, especially in the European market; nearly half of the new syndicated loans worldwide in the first half of 1999 were denominated in the euro European, the new European currency introduced on January 1, 1999. Analysts
32、 expect the European syndicated loan market to continue expanding strongly, as long as merger and acquisition activity continues to expand.Project Finance Project Finance is somewhat less susceptible to the boom-bust cyclicity of syndicated lending, but it too experienced a sharp resurgence in the e
33、arly to middle 1990s, followed by a dramatic in 1997-98. Project finance refers to financing for large-scale capital projects, which are generally very large in scale, log in term and high in risk. “Pure” project financing occurs when the debt is to be serviced only by cash flows attributable to the
34、 project itself, without recourse to the projects “sponsors”. The borrower is the project itself,. Thus project financing dose not appear o the balance sheet of the sponsors, and it does not affect their financial structure or creditworthiness.From the lenders point of view, project finance can be a
35、 risky proposition indeed. Since the projects are usually long term in nature, the debt maturities can stretch out even over several decades increasing the riskiness of the credit. Moreover, infrastructure tend to generate cash in local currency, creating currency risk for banks that are lending in
36、dollars. Even worse, revenue earned by local infrastructure companies, such as power companies, may be artificially manipulated by politicians. Thus a central task of bankers involved in project finance is to identify and quantify the risks, and then to allocate them acceptably among the various par
37、ticipants in the project.A list of the risk associated with project finance would include the following:l Resource risk: the possibility that the oil, gas, or minerals expected to be in the ground will not be present in sufficient quantities to service the debt.l Input risk: the chance that the basi
38、c viability of the project will be threatened by the unavailability or high prices of key inputs such as energy or raw materials.l Completion risk: the risk that the project will be delayed indefinitely, resulting in substantial cost overruns.l Market risk: the risk that future demand for the produc
39、t will decline.l Operating risk: the risk that even after the project becomes operational, costs will change or critical elements such as labor or transportation will be disrupted.l Force majeure: the possibility that-so-called ”acts of God” will occur to disrupt the project, ranging from warfare to
40、 weather.l Political risk: the possibility that political conditions surrounding the project will become adverse.l Regulatory risk: the risk that is represented to the projects completion by change in a governments rules and regulations pertaining to a certain industry. Such actions as tax hikes pro
41、hibition of certain activities, and opening a market up to additional competition may negatively affect the outcome of the project as well as jeopardize its ability to repay the loan.International project finance activity boomed the first half of the 1990s, reflecting deregulation, privatization, an
42、d rapid economic growth in emerging market countries. The value of loans and bonds raised without official guarantees soared by 53 percent in 1995 alone, driven largely by activity in Asia, where rapid growth was putting severe pressure on the power and transportation infrastructure. As in the syndi
43、cated loan market, margins on bank lending in this sector narrowed sharply as competition intensified, and bankers showed more willingness to assume some of the aforementioned risks. Also, as in the syndicated loan market, project finance activity slowed markedly following the financial crisis of 19
44、97-98, especially in Asian and Latin American market.Trade FinanceMuch less “sexy”and much less riskythan syndications and project finance, trade finance is the breadand butter operation of international lending. Indeed, trade finance is the great-granddaddy of international banking. Prior to the 19
45、60s, the international operations of U.S. banks were mostly limited to financing international trade. Even today, trade financing is an important revenue source for many international banks. The primary instrument of trade finance is the letter of credit(LC) which allows the credit of the bank to be
46、 substituted for that of the customer. An LC is a draft drawn by a company or individual on a bank, ordering it to pay a specified amount at a specified time accepted by the bank to a named individual (or the bearer). In effect, the bank promises that payment will be made on the specified date. This
47、 facilitates international trade between a buyer and seller who otherwise would not be willing to ship goods without some guarantee that payment will be made. Banks change a fee for LCs contingent liabilities most will never require the ban t make a payment.There are other types of LC as well. A sta
48、ndby letter of credit may be issued to reassure creditors that the bank will stand ready to make payment if the original borrower is unable. Companies routinely obtain standby LCs to back up their commercial paper offerings for instance. A performance letter of credit obliges the bank to guarantee t
49、hat its customer will perform some service as required; if the customer fails to provide the service, the bank will be forced to make restitution. All letter of credit provide fee income for the bank.Commercial Paper Commercial paper, or CP, is a standard financing technique for U.S. corporations. I
50、t refers to short-term promissory notes issued by strong corporate borrowers to sophisticated investors, usually other corporations, pension funds, mutual funds, and banks . Most commercial paper is issued for very short maturities, typically 90 days, and is rolled over at maturity. The issuing corp
51、orations is expected to provide a commercial bank loan backup facility to support its paper in the (unlikely) event of a market disturbance that might disrupt rollovers. While the commercial paper market has its origins in the United States, a lively Euro commercial paper market has sprung up as wel
52、l, primarily focused in London. Commercial paper is essentially a substitute for ban loans, although bankers do participate in the CP market both as underwriters and guarantors.附錄二全球商業(yè)銀行的功能信貸服務全球商業(yè)銀行的最主要職能是接受存款并發(fā)放貸款。事實上，貸款是全球銀行業(yè)務的基石。在海外市場上，銀行可以通過自己的海外分行或附屬行向當地顧客提供當地貨幣的貸款，資金主要來源于當地貨幣的存款和在當地貨幣市場上的借款。例
53、如,德意志銀行在墨西哥城的分行利用在當地吸納的比索存款，向當地一家汽車制造廠商提供比索貸款。這是完全意義上的當地業(yè)務，在這一過程中德意志銀行的競爭對手來自于本土銀行或其他外資銀行在當地的分行。與此相對，銀行可以進行跨國界借款，即貸款人向所在國以外的借款人發(fā)放貸款，而且所貸貨幣是所在國本幣之外的外幣。根據美聯(lián)儲主席Alan Greenspan1998年的講話，跨國界借款在此前的10年翻了一番。例如，德意志銀行的倫敦分行可以向墨西哥城的同一家汽車制造廠商提供美元貸款。這一貸款的資金來源于德意志銀行在全球范圍的美元業(yè)務。所有的借款活動，無論是直接貸款還是辛迪加貸款，應該為銀行產生收益。利息之間的差額
54、就相當于貸款的毛利：它等于銀行對貸款受到的利息減去它借款所付的利息利差收益應包括一般管理費用，風險管理費用和利潤。借貸活動同時可以產生各種手續(xù)費。例如，有一種形式的貸款，稱為循環(huán)貸款安排。此類貸款可以允許客戶在商定的時期內在商定的利率安排之下，借貸或累積借貸某筆資金，借款總額到某一最高金額上限為止。這一利率安排通常以倫敦同業(yè)銀行拆放利率，或稱LIBOR(銀行之間使用的在倫敦的美元存款的利率)為基礎，再加上一個由借款者的信用級別決定的差額。比如，通用汽車公司的借款利率是LIBOR再加上0.25個百分點；而玻利維亞政府的借款利率可能高達LIBOR再加上3個百分點。因此，在循環(huán)信貸安排中，不管最終是
55、否發(fā)放貸款，銀行將為時刻準備貸款而收取承諾費。所以我們可以看到，銀行可以從各種各樣的貸款服務中收取費用，比如辛迪加貸款和信用證服務。辛迪加貸款安排辛迪加貸款是國際銀行業(yè)的核心工具之一，銀行廣泛應用這種方式來滿足顧客的大額或高風險的貸款要求。一項辛迪加貸款通常指一組銀行同時向同一顧客發(fā)放的貸款，貸款期限相同。這樣，原本對一家銀行來講過高的信貸風險就由數家銀行一同來提供資金。此外辛迪加貸款安排可以使大中型的地方銀行也參與到國際銀行業(yè)務中來。辛迪加貸款一般需要簽訂一整套的合同文本和法律協(xié)議。例如，協(xié)議中要規(guī)定結算貨幣和所適用的法律，這樣雙方即使對簿公堂也有律可依；協(xié)議還要規(guī)定對所有的貸款人要一視同仁
56、；此外，它還要規(guī)定，在政府作為借款人的情況下，要放棄其主權豁免（這意味著，如果需要的話，銀行可以向政府提起訴訟）.辛迪加貸款(或銀團貸款)可以為牽頭銀行或全體銀行提供豐厚的手續(xù)費收入?？傊?，借款人將為未使用的信用額度支付承諾費，加上為使用的貸款支付的利息（通常是LIBOR加上一個利息差額），以及一筆代理費用。典型的做法是，一家或幾家大銀行作為牽頭銀行或代理銀行，搜集有用的信息來判斷借款者的信用級別，組織貸款，并把貸款份額再出售給其他參與的銀行。牽頭銀行必須要有能力將貸款銷售給其他金融機構，完成必要的組織工作并為之定價。大通曼哈頓（現(xiàn)在的J.P.摩根大通）在全球范圍內的辛迪加貸款中一直占據主導地
57、位，占有大約25%的市場份額。然而，辛迪加貸款分散風險的提法在20世紀80年代受到了嚴重的警告。例如，在局勢動蕩的拉美國家，國際銀行貸款絕大部分都是辛迪加性質的，而且借款人大多是不成熟的區(qū)域性機構，對國際借款的必要技術所知寥寥，或干脆一無所知。參加辛迪加的銀行大多嚴重依賴大銀行所提供的信用分析，大銀行固然技術上更加精熟，但誰也不知道他們掌握的借款人信息究竟有多大的準確度。因而，經歷20世紀70年代的快速增長期之后，辛迪加貸款到1981年后逐漸近于枯竭也是意料之中的事情，這種貸款安排導致國際銀行業(yè)花費很大一部分資源對新興市場借款人進行債務重組。很多銀行家在解讀20世紀80年代發(fā)生在第三世界的債務
58、危機時，都相信辛迪加貸款起到了推波助瀾的作用。很多的小型，地區(qū)性銀行都不堪重負，它們已經成為了國際債務重組過程中一個脆弱的鏈條。（當時路易斯安那或肯塔基的銀行為什么要向巴西貸款呢？）到80年代中期，很多銀行里的辛迪加貸款專家要么轉行要么被解雇，而銀行中的辛迪加貸款部門紛紛關門。在1988年巴塞爾協(xié)議對銀行資本充足率作出規(guī)定后，國際銀行監(jiān)管規(guī)則趨于嚴格，使辛迪加貸款萎縮的過程加快。巴塞爾協(xié)議要求銀行依據一套而且有爭議的公式，對所放貸款保持一定的資本比率，這使國際銀行業(yè)過了一段緊日子。在隨后數年內，國際銀行必須建立其資本基礎，而且從向私人部門貸款變?yōu)橹鳈噘J款（向政府和公共部門貸款），后者所需的風險
59、資本較少。因此，“俱樂部協(xié)議”在20世紀80年代末非常流行。與辛迪加貸款動輒涉及上百家甚至更多數目的銀行相比，俱樂部協(xié)議只是由幾家大銀行協(xié)商實施。但是，當80年代過去，90年代來臨時，辛迪加貸款猶如鳳凰涅磐重新興起。隨著第三世界債務問題的解決，銀行資本充足率水平又恢復正常，銀行開始重新審視自己的貸款組合，同時借款人也想再次利用銀行的貸款意愿而得到資金。辛迪加貸款能夠快速簡便地提供大量的資金；貸款銀行為借款方保守秘密，如果借款的目的在于收購和兼并，保密的承諾就顯得格外的重要。因此，到90年代中期，國際辛迪加貸款從復興走向繁榮。銀行之間為爭奪令人艷羨而且利潤豐厚的牽頭或代理銀行地位展開了激烈的競爭
60、，因此新興的辛迪加貸款總額到1996至1997年創(chuàng)造了紀錄。同時對新興市場銀行和歐洲的次可投資級公司利差貸款低到了前所未聞的地步。以捷克和南非銀行的貸款為例，18個月前的利率還是LIBOR加上1.0個百分點，到1997年已經低到了HIBOR加0.2個百分點。有觀察家認為，當時最高信用級別和次一級別的借款者之間，貸款的價差已經低到了相當危險的地步。在1997年的亞洲金融危機后，辛迪加貸款市場再度趨于緊張。某種程度上這種定價差得到了糾正。實際上，市場上最近的發(fā)展是運用“市場調控”的法則來保護銀行家們免受辛迪加貸款的風險。1997年該法則由大通曼哈頓銀行首次提出，其后越發(fā)流行。其內容是允許貸款人按照
61、市場條件的變化改變價格或貸款結構。在1998年到1999年貸款利差也急劇加大，在對拉美等新興市場國家的辛迪加貸款之中這一點特別明顯。以信用級別很高的智利電力公司為例，該公司在1998年初還可以按LIBOR加0.25個百分點來借款，到年底，利差竟達到了2.25個百分點。在1999年的下半年，受到歐洲兼并和收購活動的推動，辛迪加貸款的數量再次高漲。在全球，特別是歐洲市場，辛迪加貸款再次成為購并活動的主要融資資源；1999年1月1日，歐洲統(tǒng)一貨幣歐元誕生以后，該年度世界上幾乎一半的辛迪加貸款是用歐元來完成的。分析家們認為：只要兼并收購活動繼續(xù)，歐洲辛迪加貸款還將會強勁增長。項目融資相對于辛迪加貸款的
62、膨脹收縮的周期效應，項目融資不太呈現(xiàn)大起大落的波動。但是從20世紀90年代初到90年代中期，項目融資也經歷了一個迅速恢復，緊接著到19971998年又急劇收縮的過程。項目融資是指大型資本項目的融資，其通常特點是規(guī)模大，期限長而且風險高。“純項目融資”是指只用項目本身產生的現(xiàn)金流來支付本息，而不需要向贊助商求助。此時的借款人是項目本身，所以項目融資不出現(xiàn)在贊助商的資產負債表上，也不影響贊助商的財務結構和信用級別。事實上，從貸款人的觀點來看，可能認為項目融資的風險是相當大的。因為這些項目一般都具有長期性，債務期限可能長達幾十年，必然會增加信用風險。此外，基礎建設融資產生的現(xiàn)及流一般都是當地貨幣，這
63、就給用美元借貸的銀行增加了外匯風險。更有甚者，從當地基礎建設比如電力公司中產生的利潤收入，可能會受政客們操縱。因此參與項目融資的銀行家必須以辨別和控制風險為中心任務，然后再把風險在項目的參與者之間進行合理的分配。和項目融資有關的風險包括以下種類：l 資源風險：指在資源開發(fā)項目中，底下蘊藏的石油，天然氣或其他礦物沒有達到償還債務所需的儲量。l 投入風險：指在開發(fā)項目中，由于主要投入的物資比如動力或原材料的價格過高或可使用的數量有限，導致項目的基本可行性受到影響。l 完成風險：指項目無限期拖延，導致成本大大超標。l 市場風險：未來產品的需求可能會下降。l 經營風險：此風險是指在項目投入運行后，項目
64、成本可能發(fā)生變化，或像勞動力或運輸等關鍵因素受到破壞。l 不可抗力：發(fā)生所謂“上帝的行為”（指從戰(zhàn)爭到天氣等各種不可抗拒的因素），而導致項目運營被迫中斷的可能。l 政治風險：指項目所處環(huán)境的政治條件發(fā)生不利變化的可能性。l 監(jiān)管風險：由于與某一行業(yè)有關的政府法規(guī)和規(guī)定變化對項目的完成所構成的風險。例如稅收的增加對某種活動的禁止以及對更多的競爭者開放市場等行動，都可能對項目的收益帶來消極的影響或是危及項目的還貸能力。 20世紀90年代的上半葉，國際項目融資取得了很大的發(fā)展，這也反映了新興市場國家的放松監(jiān)管和私有化進程以及經濟的快速發(fā)展。僅1995年一年間，非官方擔保的貸款和債券的總價值增加了53
65、%之多。其中亞洲的發(fā)展起了主要的促進作用，由于該地區(qū)的經濟快速增長，也就給動力和運輸基礎設施的發(fā)展施加了巨大的壓力。如同辛迪加貸款市場，銀行借貸的利差隨著競爭日趨激烈而急劇縮小，銀行家對承擔上述的某些風險也表現(xiàn)了更過的愿望。與辛迪加貸款市場的另一相同點是，在1997到1998的金融危機之后，項目融資的發(fā)展也明顯減緩，在亞洲和拉美市場更是如此。貿易融資貿易金融遠不如辛迪加貸款和項目融資那么迷人，當然風險也要小的多。貿易金融是國際金融領域的日常業(yè)務，實際上也是國際銀行業(yè)的“祖師爺”。20世紀60年代以前，美國銀行的國際業(yè)務大部分都局限于為國際貿易融資。直到今天對很多的國際銀行來說，貿易金融仍是一個重要的利潤來源。貿易金融的首要工具就是信用證（LC），它允許銀行本身的信用被某位顧客的信用所替代。信用證是某個企業(yè)或個人向銀行開具的書面文件，要求銀行在銀行接受的前提下，在某一特定時間向某
金融學專業(yè) 論文農業(yè)銀行股份制改革研究中英文附錄
