財(cái)政學(xué)概論：第十二章 政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系

第十二章 政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系的主要議題 公共服務(wù)責(zé)任如何在各級(jí)政府間分配？稅種如何在各級(jí)政府間分配？上級(jí)對(duì)下級(jí)政府的轉(zhuǎn)移支付如何設(shè)計(jì)？問題一：公共服務(wù)責(zé)任如何在各級(jí)政府間分配？中央和地方支出責(zé)任劃分的基本框架 責(zé)任歸屬責(zé)任歸屬支出項(xiàng)目支出項(xiàng)目中央中央中央、地方中央、地方地方、中央地方、中央地方地方國(guó)防、外交、外貿(mào)、金融和貨幣政策、國(guó)防、外交、外貿(mào)、金融和貨幣政策、管制地區(qū)間貿(mào)易管制地區(qū)間貿(mào)易個(gè)人福利補(bǔ)貼、失業(yè)保險(xiǎn)、全國(guó)性交通個(gè)人福利補(bǔ)貼、失業(yè)保險(xiǎn)、全國(guó)性交通環(huán)境保護(hù)、工農(nóng)科研支持、教育環(huán)境保護(hù)、工農(nóng)科研支持、教育地區(qū)性交通、衛(wèi)生、供水、下水道、垃圾、地區(qū)性交通、衛(wèi)生、供水、下水道、垃圾、警察、消防、公園、娛樂設(shè)施警察、消防、公園、娛樂設(shè)施表：中央和地方支出責(zé)任劃分的基本框架Charles M.Tiebout:A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures5蒂布特（1956）模型 A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures 1.Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will move to that community where their preference patterns,which are set,are best satisfied.2.Consumer-voters are assumed to have full knowledge of differences among revenue and expenditure patterns and to react to these differences.3.There are a large number of communities in which the consumer-voters may choose to live.蒂布特（1956）模型 4.Restrictions due to employment opportunities are not considered.5.The public services supplied exhibit no external economies or diseconomies between communities.6.For every pattern of community services set by,say,a city manager who follows the preferences of the older residents of the community,there is an optimal community size.7.Communities below the optimum size seek to attract new residents to lower average costs.Those above optimum size do just the opposite.Those at an optimum try to keep their populations constant.Oates(1969)房產(chǎn)稅應(yīng)當(dāng)是居民選擇不同社區(qū)居住的價(jià)格。Oates(1969):The effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values An empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis 注：房產(chǎn)稅指的是按照房產(chǎn)的價(jià)值的一定比例征收的稅種。Hamilton(1975)Hamilton(1975):Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments Zoning 指的是某些社區(qū)規(guī)定住宅的占地面積大?。↙ot size）、居住類型（Single family house/multi-family house）等。蒂布特模型是典型的美國(guó)式基層公共服務(wù)提供模式 政府直下而上逐步形成的 地方政府對(duì)下負(fù)責(zé) 地方可以按照自己的意愿征稅和支出 財(cái)政分權(quán)（Fiscal Federalism）以上事項(xiàng)通過公共選擇的機(jī)制確定上述設(shè)想的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn) 優(yōu)點(diǎn)：公共服務(wù)產(chǎn)出更符合當(dāng)?shù)丶{稅人口味：麥當(dāng)勞 促進(jìn)地方政府間競(jìng)爭(zhēng) 缺點(diǎn)：外部性（Externalities）：河流 規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)（Scale economy）：（電子）圖書館 均等問題（Equity Issues）公共服務(wù)責(zé)任如何在各級(jí)政府間分配？受益原則 公共產(chǎn)品的覆蓋范圍問題二：稅種如何在各級(jí)政府間分配？How to allocate taxes？02004006008001000120014001600General sales taxExcise taxCorporate income taxIndividual income taxSocial insurance and retirement receiptsProperty taxothersRevenue38%9%8%11%5%23%2007-2008 total tax revenue:3854 billion dollars(USA)最基層政府征什么稅：財(cái)產(chǎn)稅 保證最基本的稅收 征管成本要相對(duì)較?。盒畔?yōu)勢(shì) 受益稅（Benefit Tax）如果地方政府的收入來源是所得稅（或銷售稅），則在收入來源地（或銷售實(shí)現(xiàn)地）與繳稅人獲取公共服務(wù)地點(diǎn)不一致的情況下，會(huì)產(chǎn)生“所付”和“所得”的錯(cuò)配 政治成本相對(duì)小State&Local Government by Source：2010State Local Property2%75%Sales and gross receipts 49%16%General sales 32%11%Selective sales17%5%Individual income 34%4%Corporate income 5%1%Motor vehicle license 3%0%Other taxes 7%4%http:/www.census.gov/govs/local/Federal Budget Receipts by Source：2009PercentageIndividual income taxes43%Corporation income taxes7%Social insurance and retirement receipts42%Excise taxes3%Other5%http:/www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府稅收收入美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府稅收收入結(jié)構(gòu)結(jié)構(gòu)：1934-2010年年0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%19341938194219461950195419581962196619701974197819821986199019941998200220062010其他社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)稅企業(yè)所得稅個(gè)人所得稅消費(fèi)稅http:/www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals聯(lián)邦政府主要收入：個(gè)人所得稅MarginalTax RateSingleMarried Filing Jointly or Qualified Widow(er)Married Filing SeparatelyHead of Household10%$0$8,925$0$17,850$0$8,925$0$12,75015%$8,926$36,250$17,851$72,500$8,926$36,250$12,751$48,60025%$36,251$87,850$72,501$146,400$36,251$73,200$48,601$125,45028%$87,851$183,250$146,401$223,050$73,201$111,525$125,451$203,15033%$183,251$398,350$223,051$398,350$111,526$199,175$203,151$398,35035%$398,351$400,000$398,351$450,000$199,176$225,000$398,351$425,00039.6%$400,001+$450,001+$225,001+$425,001+http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Income_tax_in_the_United_States#Marginal_tax_rates_for_2013關(guān)于財(cái)政分權(quán) 財(cái)政分權(quán)（Fiscal Decentralisation）給予地方一定的稅收權(quán)力和支出責(zé)任范圍，并允許其自主決定預(yù)算支出規(guī)模與結(jié)構(gòu)財(cái)政分權(quán)的衡量“tax autonomy”sub-central governments(SCGs)right to introduce or to abolish a tax,to set tax rates,to define the tax base,or to grant tax allowances or reliefs to individuals and firms.http:/www.oecd.org/tax/federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisationdatabase.htm財(cái)政分權(quán)的衡量a.1a.2-The recipient SCG sets the tax rate and any tax reliefs without needing to consult a higher level government.-The recipient SCG sets the rate and any reliefs after consulting a higher level government.b.1b.2-The recipient SCG sets the tax rate,and a higher level government does not set upper or lower limits on the rate chosen.-The recipient SCG sets the tax rate,and a higher level government does sets upper and/or lower limits on the rate chosen.c.1c.2 c.3-The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs but it sets tax allowances only.-The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs but it sets tax credits only.-The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs and it sets both tax allowances and tax credits.d.1d.2d.3d.4-There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the SCGs determine the revenue split.-There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split can be changed only with the consent of SCGs.-There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is determined in legislation,and where it may be changed unilaterally by a higher level government,but less frequently than once a year.-There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is determined annually by a higher level government.e-Other cases in which the central government sets the rate and base of the SCG tax.f-None of the above categories a,b,c,d or e applieshttp:/www.oecd.org/tax/federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisationdatabase.htm資料：Tax autonomy indicatorshttp:/www.oecd.org/tax/federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisationdatabase.htmhttp:/taxfoundation.org/mapshttp:/taxfoundation.org/mapshttp:/taxfoundation.org/mapshttp:/taxfoundation.org/maps聯(lián)邦：汽油（18.4美分/加侖）http:/taxfoundation.org/mapshttp:/taxfoundation.org/maps辨 析收支集中（分散）程度=？集權(quán)（分權(quán)）程度RevenueExpenditureUSAChinaRevenueExpenditureFederalSubnational6464551.58.5CentralYear 2010Year 2011Subnational集權(quán)（分權(quán)）程度：美國(guó)0%100%政治集權(quán)程度0%100%收入集權(quán)程度0%100%支出集權(quán)程度集權(quán)（分權(quán)）程度：中國(guó)0%100%政治集權(quán)程度0%100%收入集權(quán)程度0%100%支出集權(quán)程度1978-2013年中央和地方公共財(cái)政收入占比41%22%56%59%78%44%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%197819791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013中央公共財(cái)政收入占比地方公共財(cái)政收入占比1978-2013年中央和地方公共財(cái)政支出占比15%85%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%197819791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013中央公共財(cái)政支出占比地方公共財(cái)政支出占比問題三：上級(jí)對(duì)下級(jí)政府的轉(zhuǎn)移支付如何設(shè)計(jì)？財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度 彌補(bǔ)縱向財(cái)政缺口彌補(bǔ)縱向財(cái)政缺口 縱向財(cái)政均衡。彌補(bǔ)橫向財(cái)政缺口彌補(bǔ)橫向財(cái)政缺口 這種功能也稱實(shí)現(xiàn)橫向財(cái)政均衡。彌補(bǔ)地區(qū)間公共產(chǎn)品轄區(qū)間的外部效應(yīng)彌補(bǔ)地區(qū)間公共產(chǎn)品轄區(qū)間的外部效應(yīng) 支持落后地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展支持落后地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展http:/taxfoundation.org/maps轉(zhuǎn)移支付（transfer/grant）:用途？Earmarked grants（專項(xiàng)轉(zhuǎn)移支付）An earmarked grant is a grant that is given under the condition that it can only be used for a specific purpose.Non-earmarked grants（一般性轉(zhuǎn)移支付）Non-earmarked grants can be spent as if they were the receiving sub-national governments own(non-earmarked)tax revenues.專項(xiàng)轉(zhuǎn)移支付:是否配套？Matching grants（配套轉(zhuǎn)移支付）Matching grants are grants designed to complement sub-national contributions.Non-matching grants（不配套轉(zhuǎn)移支付）Non-matching grants are grants not directly linked to any sub-national contribution.配套轉(zhuǎn)移支付：是否封頂？Close-ended grants：封頂?shù)霓D(zhuǎn)移支付 Put a ceiling on the amount of grant Open-ended grants：不封頂?shù)霓D(zhuǎn)移支付 No ceiling轉(zhuǎn)移支付分類圖不封頂配套專項(xiàng)封頂轉(zhuǎn)移支付非配套一般性專項(xiàng)轉(zhuǎn)移支付G1c1E1Units of public good(G)per yearConsumption(c)per yearAB配套+不封頂RG2c2E2G1和G2的關(guān)系？專項(xiàng)轉(zhuǎn)移支付G1c1E1Units of public good(G)per yearConsumption(c)per yearAB配套+封頂RG3c3E3D專項(xiàng)+非配套 VS 一般性G1c1E1Units of public good(G)per yearConsumption(c)per yearABRG2c4E4HJ粘蠅紙效應(yīng)（Flypaper effect）G1c1E1Units of public good(G)per yearConsumption(c)per yearABRG2c4E4HJG1c1E1Units of public good(G)per yearConsumption(c)per yearABRG2c4E4HJ(a)收入增加(b)轉(zhuǎn)移支付增加 我國(guó)的政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系Share of revenue:1985-199338343028226266707278010203040506070809019851990199119921993Central RevunueSubnational Revenue%In the late 1980s and early 1990s,the revenue of central government is far from enough to effectively implement policies.The central budget is“on the edge of cliff”.“Without reforming present fiscal system,there will be no central budget anymore.”said vice Premier Zhu Rongji at national conference on finance and taxation in July,1993The Iron Premier and TSS Reform Soon,Vice Premier Zhu Rongji spent two months in preparing the TSS reform with governors of 13 wealthy provinces and discussing the assignment of revenues and responsibilities between central and sub-national governments.Zhu Rongji 中央財(cái)政支出國(guó)防、武警經(jīng)費(fèi)，外交和援外支出，中央級(jí)行政管理費(fèi)，中央統(tǒng)管的基本建設(shè)投資，中央直屬企業(yè)的技術(shù)改造和新產(chǎn)品試制費(fèi)，地質(zhì)勘探費(fèi)，中央安排的農(nóng)業(yè)支出，中央負(fù)擔(dān)的國(guó)內(nèi)外債務(wù)的還本付息支出，以及中央本級(jí)負(fù)擔(dān)的公檢法支出和文化、教育、衛(wèi)生、科學(xué)等各項(xiàng)事業(yè)費(fèi)支出。地方財(cái)政支出地方行政管理費(fèi)，公檢法經(jīng)費(fèi)，民兵事業(yè)費(fèi)，地方統(tǒng)籌安排的基本建設(shè)投資，地方企業(yè)的改造和新產(chǎn)品試制經(jīng)費(fèi)，農(nóng)業(yè)支出，城市維護(hù)和建設(shè)經(jīng)費(fèi)，地方文化、教育、衛(wèi)生等各項(xiàng)事業(yè)費(fèi)以及其他支出。我國(guó)政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系：改革歷程表：現(xiàn)行中央和地方支出職責(zé)劃分表：現(xiàn)行中央和地方支出職責(zé)劃分國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于實(shí)行分稅制財(cái)政管理體制的決定國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于實(shí)行分稅制財(cái)政管理體制的決定（國(guó)發(fā)國(guó)發(fā)199385號(hào)號(hào)）中央固定收入關(guān)稅，海關(guān)代征消費(fèi)稅和增值稅，消費(fèi)稅，鐵道部門、各銀行總行、各保險(xiǎn)公司總公司等集中交納的收入（包括營(yíng)業(yè)稅、利潤(rùn)和城市維護(hù)建設(shè)稅），未納入共享范圍的中央企業(yè)所得稅、中央企業(yè)上交的利潤(rùn)等。中央與地方共享收入增值稅中央分享75，地方分享25；納入共享范圍的企業(yè)所得稅和個(gè)人所得中央分享60%，地方分享40%；資源稅按不同的資源品種劃分，海洋石油資源稅為中央收入，其余資源稅為地方收入；證券交易印花稅中央分享97%，地方（上海、深圳）分享3%。地方固定收入營(yíng)業(yè)稅（不含鐵道部門、各銀行總行、各保險(xiǎn)公司總公司集中交納的營(yíng)業(yè)稅），地方企業(yè)上交利潤(rùn)，城鎮(zhèn)土地使用稅，城市維護(hù)建設(shè)稅（不含鐵道部門、各銀行總行、各保險(xiǎn)公司總公司集中交納的部分），房產(chǎn)稅，車船使用稅，印花稅，耕地占用稅，契稅，遺產(chǎn)和贈(zèng)予稅，煙葉稅，土地增值稅，國(guó)有土地有償使用收入等。我國(guó)政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系：改革歷程表：現(xiàn)行中央和地方收入劃分表：現(xiàn)行中央和地方收入劃分國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于實(shí)行分稅制財(cái)政管理體制的決定國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于實(shí)行分稅制財(cái)政管理體制的決定（國(guó)發(fā)國(guó)發(fā)199385號(hào)號(hào)）國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于印發(fā)所得稅收入分享改革方案的通知國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于印發(fā)所得稅收入分享改革方案的通知（國(guó)發(fā)（國(guó)發(fā)200137200137號(hào)）號(hào)）項(xiàng) 目決算數(shù)：億元占比一、中央對(duì)地方轉(zhuǎn)移支付一、中央對(duì)地方轉(zhuǎn)移支付23677 83%（一）一般性轉(zhuǎn)移支付（之前：財(cái)力性轉(zhuǎn)移支付）11317 40%1.均衡性轉(zhuǎn)移支付（之前：一般性轉(zhuǎn)移支付/Equalization grant）3918 14%2.民族地區(qū)轉(zhuǎn)移支付276 1%3.縣級(jí)基本財(cái)力保障機(jī)制獎(jiǎng)補(bǔ)資金548 2%4.調(diào)整工資轉(zhuǎn)移支付2358 8%5.農(nóng)村稅費(fèi)改革轉(zhuǎn)移支付769 3%6.資源枯竭城市財(cái)力性轉(zhuǎn)移支付50 0%7.定額補(bǔ)助（原體制補(bǔ)助）138 0%8.企事業(yè)單位劃轉(zhuǎn)補(bǔ)助348 1%9.結(jié)算財(cái)力補(bǔ)助369 1%10.工商部門停征兩費(fèi)轉(zhuǎn)移支付80 0%11.村級(jí)公益事業(yè)一事一議獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)資金10 0%12.一般公共服務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移支付24 0%13.公共安全轉(zhuǎn)移支付330 1%14.教育轉(zhuǎn)移支付894 3%15.社會(huì)保障和就業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移支付1202 4%16.醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生轉(zhuǎn)移支付4 0%（二）專項(xiàng)轉(zhuǎn)移支付12360 43%其中：教育520 2%科學(xué)技術(shù)78 0%社會(huì)保障和就業(yè)1640 6%醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生1206 4%環(huán)境保護(hù)1114 4%農(nóng)林水事務(wù)3183 11%二、中央對(duì)地方稅收返還二、中央對(duì)地方稅收返還4887 17%增值稅和消費(fèi)稅返還（Tax rebate）3423 12%所得稅基數(shù)返還910 3%成品油稅費(fèi)改革稅收返還1531 5%地方上解-977-3%中央對(duì)地方稅收返還和轉(zhuǎn)移支付中央對(duì)地方稅收返還和轉(zhuǎn)移支付28564 100%稅收返還和轉(zhuǎn)移支付 2009年中央對(duì)地方省以下財(cái)政體制：北京的案例 市級(jí)固定收入包括：個(gè)人所得稅、契稅、固定資產(chǎn)投資方向調(diào)節(jié)稅（2000年暫停征收）。區(qū)縣固定收入包括：印花稅、資源稅、房產(chǎn)稅、車船使用和牌照稅、屠宰稅、農(nóng)業(yè)稅、農(nóng)業(yè)特產(chǎn)稅、耕地占用稅。市與區(qū)縣共享收入包括：營(yíng)業(yè)稅和增值稅的地方部分、企業(yè)所得稅、城鎮(zhèn)土地使用稅、土地增值稅、城市維護(hù)建設(shè)稅、教育費(fèi)附加收入。市與區(qū)縣各分享50。北京市人民政府關(guān)于北京市財(cái)政管理體制改革的決定北京市人民政府關(guān)于北京市財(cái)政管理體制改革的決定（京政發(fā)京政發(fā)199943199943號(hào)）號(hào)）Tax rebate（增值稅和消費(fèi)稅返還）按照一九九三年地方實(shí)際收入以及稅制改革和中央與地方收入劃分情況，核定一九九三年中央從地方凈上劃的收入數(shù)額（既消費(fèi)稅+75%的增值稅）。一九九三年中央凈上劃收入，全額返還地方，保證現(xiàn)有地方既得財(cái)力，并以此作為以后中央對(duì)地方稅收返還基數(shù)。一九九四年以后，稅收返還額在一九九三年基數(shù)上逐年遞增，遞增率按全國(guó)增值稅和消費(fèi)稅的平均增長(zhǎng)率的1:0.3系數(shù)確定,即上述兩稅全國(guó)平均每增長(zhǎng)1%,中央財(cái)政對(duì)地方的稅收返還增長(zhǎng)0.3%.Tax RebateExampleIf(75%*VAT+ET)=100 Then,Tax Rebate=100If growth rate=15%Then,Tax Rebate=100*(1+0.3*15%)=105If growth rate=15%Then,Tax Rebate=105*(1+0.3*15%)=109The aim of tax rebate Notes：The provincial governors term of office is 5 years.After 5 years,another governor is appointed.During the first 5 years,the revenue of certain province will not be affected so much.But gradually larger portion of 75%*VAT+ET will belong to the central government.Example1993199419952000 20052010201275%*VAT+ET100 115 132 266 535 1076 1423 Tax Rebate100105 109 136 170 211 231 Growth Rate15%15%15%15%15%15%Tax Rebate/(75%*VAT+ET)100%91%83%51%32%20%16%Example0%20%40%60%80%100%120%020040060080010001200140016001993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201275%*VAT+ETTax RebateTax Rebate/(75%*VAT+ET)75%*VAT+ETTax RebateTax Rebate/(75%*VAT+ET)75%*VAT+ETTax RebatePercentageActual amount YearCentral LevelTax RebateTax Rebate/(75%*VAT+ET)75%*VATET20035426 1182 2527 200711603 2207 3215 2011 18277 6936 5040 Equalization grant/transfer(均衡性轉(zhuǎn)移支付)In 1995,the equalization grant/transfer was established with a view to reducing regional fiscal disparities.The amount of the equalization grant for a province i is determined by three factors:standard revenue of the province,standard expenditure of the province,and the share of the provincial standard fiscal gap of the total fiscal gap.Equalization grant“Standard”means“Should”,not“actually”For every unit of gap they should have,what is the amount they can get.The standard revenues The standard revenues are equal to standard local own and shared taxes plus tax rebate plus various grants.For each type of tax,standard tax revenue is determined by multiplying the standard tax base with the standard tax rate.Example:The income tax base of salaries is estimated using per capita taxable salaries net of exemptions and number of employees.The tax rate of salaries is local average effective tax rateThe standard expenditures The standard expenditures are measured as the total spending of seven sectors and for each sector the standard spending cover personal expenditure(salaries and bonus)and office expenditures(vehicles,heating,and others).Example Total equalization grant available is 10 Yuan Assuming Standard revenue of province i is 60 Standard expenditure of province i is 80 Standard revenue of province j is 200 Standard expenditure of province j is 280 equalization grant for province i is:（80-60）*10/100=2Trend of equity of fiscal capacity:measure of C.V.Source:Calculated according to China Statistical Abstract(1996-2012)Note:C.V.refers to Coefficient of Variation.The coefficient of variation(C.V.)is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.0.000.200.400.600.801.001.201.4019951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011C.V.of per capita fiscal revenueC.V.of per capita fiscal expenditureTrend of equity of fiscal capacity:measure of Gini Coefficient0.150.20.250.30.350.40.450.519951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011Gini coefficient of per capita fiscal revenueGini coefficient of per capita fiscal expenditureSource:Calculated according to China Statistical Abstract(1996-2012)